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The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

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  • Michael Finus
  • Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
  • Ekko Ierland

Abstract

We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting as applied in many international organizations. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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  • Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Ekko Ierland, 2005. "The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 95-127, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:95-127
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3411-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
    2. Hans‐Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, September.
    3. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2009. "Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2‐3), pages 337-363, March.
    4. Andries Hof & Michel Elzen & Detlef Vuuren, 2009. "Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: what can we learn from model studies?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 39-62, February.
    5. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
    6. Frank Jotzo & John C. V. Pezzey, 2005. "Optimal intensity targets for emissions trading under uncertainty (now replaced by EEN0605)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0504, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
    7. Sferra, Fabio & Tavoni, Massimo, 2013. "Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with Open Entry: A Numerical Assessment," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 156486, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    8. Herve Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2013. "Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game," Discussion Papers 13-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    9. Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya & Herve Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2019. "Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game," Working Papers 266042710, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    10. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
    11. Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 343-365, December.
    12. Tibor Besedeš & Erik P. Johnson & Xinping Tian, 2020. "Economic determinants of multilateral environmental agreements," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 832-864, August.
    13. Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 205-223, April.
    14. van der Pol, Thomas & Weikard, Hans-Peter & van Ierland, Ekko, 2012. "Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 112-120.
    15. Alfred Endres & Bianca Rundshagen, 2013. "Incentives to Diffuse Advanced Abatement Technology Under the Formation of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 177-210, October.
    16. Kotaro Kawamata & Masahide Horita, 2014. "Applying Matching Strategies in Climate Change Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 401-419, May.
    17. Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023. "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 419-438, June.
    18. Eren Cifci & Matthew E. Oliver, 2018. "Reassessing the Links between GHG Emissions, Economic Growth, and the UNFCCC: A Difference-in-Differences Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-22, January.
    19. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Peters, Wolfgang & Ufert, Aneta, 2018. "International environmental agreements on climate protection: A Binary choice model with heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 191-205.
    20. Engwerda, J.C., 2012. "Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study Of Macroeconomics of Climate Change," Discussion Paper 2012-045, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    21. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 9, pages 19-48, May.
    22. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
    23. Holladay J. Scott & Livermore Michael A., 2013. "Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 131-157, August.
    24. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
    25. Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya & Herve Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2020. "Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games," Working Papers 301895429, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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