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New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

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  • Johan Eyckmans

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies and EHSAL Europese Hogeschool Brussel)

  • Michael Finus

    (Department of Economics, University of Hagen,)

Abstract

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of internal& external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0318, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0318
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    Cited by:

    1. Achim Hagen & Klaus Eisenack, 2019. "Climate Clubs Versus Single Coalitions: The Ambition Of International Environmental Agreements," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 1-19, August.
    2. Al Khourdajie, Alaa & Finus, Michael, 2020. "Measures to enhance the effectiveness of international climate agreements: The case of border carbon adjustments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, August.
    4. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
    5. Nicky R. M. Pouw & Hans-Peter Weikard & Richard B. Howarth, 2022. "Economic analysis of international environmental agreements: lessons learnt 2000–2020," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 279-294, June.
    6. Noha Elboghdadly & Michael Finus, 2020. "Enforcing Climate Agreements: The Role of Escalating Border Carbon Adjustments," Graz Economics Papers 2020-11, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    7. Yu-Hsuan Lin, 2018. "How social preferences influence the stability of a climate coalition," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(2), pages 151-166.
    8. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
    9. Alberto Ansuategi & Marta Escapa, 2004. "Is international cooperation on climate change good for the environment?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(7), pages 1-11.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    design of climate treaty protocol; coalition formation; non-cooperative game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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