A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
We study endogenous coalition formation in contexts where individual (and group) payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure that might form. We capture potential interaction across coalitions by means of a partition function.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:||Jan 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.