IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/grz/wpaper/2020-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of International Climate Agreements: The Case of Border Carbon Adjustments

Author

Listed:
  • Alaa Al Khourdajie

    () (Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, UK)

  • Michael Finus

    () (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

Actions on climate change which are not supported by all countries are not very effective. However, full participation in a global climate treaty with meaningful emission reductions is difficult to achieve. The non-excludability of the public good mitigation provides an incentive to abstain from global action. Moreover, carbon leakage renders it unattractive to join a treaty without full participation. We study whether and under which conditions border carbon adjustments (BCAs) can mitigate free-riding and reduce carbon leakage in a simple strategic trade model. We show that BCAs can lead to large stable climate agreements, including full participation, associated with large global welfare gains if treaties do not restrict membership (open membership), as this is typical for environmental agreements. We caution against restricting accession to treaties (exclusive membership), as this is typical for trade agreements, which may serve individual but not global interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Alaa Al Khourdajie & Michael Finus, 2020. "Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of International Climate Agreements: The Case of Border Carbon Adjustments," Graz Economics Papers 2020-04, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2020-04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www100.uni-graz.at/vwlwww/forschung/RePEc/wpaper/2020-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    2. Weitzel, Matthias & Hübler, Michael & Peterson, Sonja, 2012. "Fair, optimal or detrimental? Environmental vs. strategic use of border carbon adjustment," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(S2), pages 198-207.
    3. Di Comite, Francesco & Thisse, Jacques-François & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2014. "Verti-zontal differentiation in export markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 50-66.
    4. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2013. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 37-50.
    5. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    6. Keen, Michael & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2014. "Coordinating climate and trade policies: Pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 119-128.
    7. Finus, Michael & Al Khourdajie, Alaa, 2018. "Strategic Environmental Policy, International Trade and Self-enforcing Agreements: The Role of Consumers' Taste for Variety," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 7(3-4), pages 317-350, February.
    8. Nikos Tsakiris & Michael Michael & Panos Hatzipanayotou, 2014. "Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 563-578, August.
    9. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    10. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
    11. Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Giovanni Ruta, 2012. "Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 368-394, SUMMER.
    12. Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2014. "Optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers: Decomposing leakage and terms-of-trade motives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 101-111.
    13. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    14. Nikolaos Vlassis, 2013. "The Welfare Consequences of Pollution-Tax Harmonization," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 227-238, October.
    15. Hans‐Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, September.
    16. Böhringer, Christoph & Rosendahl, Knut Einar & Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid, 2017. "Robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 35-46.
    17. Christoph Böhringer & André Müller & Jan Schneider, 2015. "Carbon Tariffs Revisited," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 629-672.
    18. By Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2015. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 897-917.
    19. Bruno Nkuiya, 2013. "Trade Structure, Transboundary Pollution and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Effects on Environmental Taxes and Welfare," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(3), pages 337-355, July.
    20. Dimitri Zenghelis & Nicholas Stern, 2009. "Principles for a Global Deal for Limiting the Risks from Climate Change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(3), pages 307-311, July.
    21. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2017. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-20.
    22. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    23. Caron, Justin, 2012. "Estimating carbon leakage and the efficiency of border adjustments in general equilibrium — Does sectoral aggregation matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(S2), pages 111-126.
    24. Branger, Frédéric & Quirion, Philippe, 2014. "Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 29-39.
    25. Francis Bloch, 2003. "Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers," Chapters, in: Carlo Carraro (ed.),The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    26. Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-737, September.
    27. Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February.
    28. Soham Baksi & Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2016. "International Trade and Environmental Cooperation among Heterogeneous Countries," Departmental Working Papers 2016-03, The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics.
    29. Eyland, Terry & Zaccour, Georges, 2014. "Carbon tariffs and cooperative outcomes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 718-728.
    30. Finus, Michael & McGinty, Matthew, 2019. "The anti-paradox of cooperation: Diversity may pay!," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 541-559.
    31. Yi, Sang-Seung, 2000. "Free-Trade Areas and Welfare: An Equilibrium Analysis," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 336-347, May.
    32. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    33. Burguet, Roberto & Sempere, Jaume, 2003. "Trade liberalization, environmental policy, and welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-37, July.
    34. Hoel, Michael, 1996. "Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, January.
    35. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
    36. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    37. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    38. Loke, Wai-Heng & Winters, L. Alan, 2012. "Why Is Open Regionalism Not Always Good?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 27, pages 437-465.
    39. Ulph, Alistair, 1996. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-281, May.
    40. Fischer, Carolyn & Fox, Alan K., 2012. "Comparing policies to combat emissions leakage: Border carbon adjustments versus rebates," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 199-216.
    41. Soham Baksi & Amrita Ray chaudhuri, 2009. "On trade liberalization and transboundary pollution," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2605-2612.
    42. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    43. Stiglitz Joseph, 2006. "A New Agenda for Global Warming," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 3(7), pages 1-4, July.
    44. Terry Eyland & Georges Zaccour, 2012. "Strategic Effects Of A Border Tax Adjustment," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(03), pages 1-22.
    45. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Noha Elboghdadly & Michael Finus, 2020. "Non-Cooperative Climate Policies among Asymmetric Countries: Production- versus Consumption-based Carbon Taxes," Graz Economics Papers 2020-16, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    2. Natalia Escobar-Pemberthy & Maria Ivanova, 2020. "Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Rationale and Design of the Environmental Conventions Index," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 12(17), pages 1-24, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-enforcing international climate agreements; international trade; border carbon adjustments;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2020-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Scholz). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vgrazat.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.