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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps

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  • By Thomas Eichner
  • Rüdiger Pethig

Abstract

We study self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a model with symmetric countries, international trade, and emission tax policy and find that the first-best global IEA may be self-enforcing. This is in sharp contrast to the known case of cap-and-trade policy in which self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and fail to achieve significant improvements in welfare and damage reduction compared to global non-cooperation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for global self-enforcing IEAs and show, amongst other things, that they are more likely with less severe climate damage. Another result is that their determinants are similar for climate coalitions playing Nash or being Stackelberg leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • By Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2015. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 897-917.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:67:y:2015:i:4:p:897-917.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpv037
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    Cited by:

    1. Yu-Bong Lai, 2023. "Capital mobility and environmental policy: taxes versus TEP," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 326-350, April.
    2. Ritter, Hendrik & Runkel, Marco & Zimmermann, Karl, 2019. "Environmental Effects of Capital Income Taxation - A New Double Dividend?," EconStor Preprints 195172, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rudiger, 2018. "Global Environmental Agreements and International Trade: Asymmetry of Countries Matters," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 7(3-4), pages 281-316, February.
    4. Kefu Lin & Rui Pan & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2024. "Carbon tax vs. emission trading in a monopolistically competitive market with heterogeneous firms," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 73(2), pages 825-848, August.
    5. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2017. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-20.
    6. Ritter, Hendrik & Zimmermann, Karl, 2019. "Cap-and-Trade Policy vs. Carbon Taxation: Of Leakage and Linkage," EconStor Preprints 197796, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    7. Al Khourdajie, Alaa & Finus, Michael, 2020. "Measures to enhance the effectiveness of international climate agreements: The case of border carbon adjustments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    8. Gilbert Kollenbach, 2019. "Unilateral climate policy and the green paradox: Extraction costs matter," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 1036-1083, August.
    9. Hagen, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2024. "Political influence on international climate agreements with border carbon adjustment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    10. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks - Can issue linkage enhance cooperation?," Discussion Paper Series 2018_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jun 2018.
    11. Soham Baksi & Amrita RayChaudhuri, 2025. "Imperfect Competition, Border Carbon Adjustments, and Stability of a Global Climate Agreement," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(3), pages 527-564.
    12. Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016. "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers V-387-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2016.
    13. Catia Montagna & Avanti Nisha Pinto & Nikolaos Vlassis, 2020. "Welfare and Trade Effects of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(2), pages 331-345, July.
    14. Cheng, Haitao, 2024. "Domestic versus international emissions trading with capital mobility," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    15. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2023. "Climate Coalitions and their Persistent Ineffectiveness," Discussion Paper Series 2023_04, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Apr 2023.
    16. Matthew McGinty, 2020. "Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(2), pages 449-474, October.
    17. Harstad, Bård & Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia, 2022. "Prices vs. quantities for self-enforcing agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    18. CHENG, Haitao & YANASE, Akihiko, 2025. "International Transfers of Green Technology and Carbon Mitigation Outcomes," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-154, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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