IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/esprep/197796.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cap-and-Trade Policy vs. Carbon Taxation: Of Leakage and Linkage

Author

Listed:
  • Ritter, Hendrik
  • Zimmermann, Karl

Abstract

We assess a 2-period, non-cooperative equilibrium of an n country policy game where countries chose either (i) carbon taxes, (ii) cap-and-trade policy with local permit markets or (iii) cap-and-trade policy with internationally linked permit markets and potential central redistribution of permit revenues. Policy makers maximizes welfare, which depends on household consumption over time and environmental damage from period-1 resource use. We assume costless and complete extraction of this non-renewable resource, so damage only depends on speed of extraction. Tax policy is the least efficient option due to carbon leakage, which introduces a second externality adding to the environmental externality. Cap-and-trade policy does not show any leakage since all symmetric countries will employ caps. Its equilibrium thus only suffers from the environmental externality and welfare is higher than under carbon taxation. The policy scenario with linked permit markets and central redistribution yields an efficient outcome. The redistribution of revenues creates a negative externality which offsets the positive environmental externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritter, Hendrik & Zimmermann, Karl, 2019. "Cap-and-Trade Policy vs. Carbon Taxation: Of Leakage and Linkage," EconStor Preprints 197796, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:197796
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/197796/1/Taxes_vs_Caps_2019.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erik Haites, 2018. "Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we learned?," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(8), pages 955-966, September.
    2. Michael Hoel, 2005. "The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 157-173, March.
    3. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Ru¨diger, 2013. "Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral cost-effective action," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 185-201.
    4. By Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2015. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 897-917.
    5. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
    6. Fouquet, Roger, 2010. "The slow search for solutions: Lessons from historical energy transitions by sector and service," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 6586-6596, November.
    7. Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
    8. Kazuharu Kiyono & Jota Ishikawa, 2013. "Environmental Management Policy Under International Carbon Leakage," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1057-1083, August.
    9. Höök, Mikael & Tang, Xu, 2013. "Depletion of fossil fuels and anthropogenic climate change—A review," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 797-809.
    10. Mikhail Golosov & John Hassler & Per Krusell & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2014. "Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(1), pages 41-88, January.
    11. Sim, Seung-Gyu & Lin, Hsuan-Chih, 2018. "Competitive dominance of emission trading over Pigouvian taxation in a globalized economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 158-161.
    12. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2017. "Welfare Ranking of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Capital Mobility and Cross‐Border Pollution," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 317-336, July.
    13. Gabriela Iacobuta & Navroz K. Dubash & Prabhat Upadhyaya & Mekdelawit Deribe & Niklas Höhne, 2018. "National climate change mitigation legislation, strategy and targets: a global update," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(9), pages 1114-1132, October.
    14. Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein, 2013. "Carbon Taxes Versus Cap And Trade: A Critical Review," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-28.
    15. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Jean Tirole, 2017. "Policy Brief—Translating the Collective Climate Goal Into a Common Climate Commitment," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(1), pages 165-171.
    16. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    17. A. Denny Ellerman & Claudio Marcantonini & Aleksandar Zaklan, 2016. "The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(1), pages 89-107.
    18. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    19. Hoel, Michael & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1996. "Depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts of global warming," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 115-136, June.
    20. Shafiee, Shahriar & Topal, Erkan, 2009. "When will fossil fuel reserves be diminished?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 181-189, January.
    21. Christian Flachsland & Robert Marschinski & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2009. "To link or not to link: benefits and disadvantages of linking cap-and-trade systems," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(4), pages 358-372, July.
    22. Olli Tahvonen, 1995. "Dynamics of pollution control when damage is sensitive to the rate of pollution accumulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 9-27, January.
    23. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate Policy; Carbon Tax; Cap-and-Trade Policy; Linked Permit Markets;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:197796. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/zbwkide.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.