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Changement climatique, instruments économiques et propositions pour un accord post-Kyoto: une synthèse

  • Daubanes, Julien

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File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/env/wp_env_6_2009.pdf
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Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 09-006.

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Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:22035
Contact details of provider: Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23
Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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  26. Bovenberg, A.L. & de Mooij, R.A., 1994. "Environmental levies and distortionary taxation," Other publications TiSEM 4b32deaa-ec2f-4de7-b59b-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. Stavins, Robert & Jaffe, Adam & Newell, Richard, 1998. "The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change," Discussion Papers dp-98-12-rev, Resources For the Future.
  28. Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
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  35. Palmer, Karen & Newell, Richard & Gillingham, Kenneth, 2004. "Retrospective Examination of Demand-side Energy-efficiency Policies," Discussion Papers dp-04-19, Resources For the Future.
  36. Fischer, Carolyn & Toman, Michael & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Using Emissions Trading to Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview of Policy Design and Implementation Issues," Discussion Papers dp-98-40, Resources For the Future.
  37. Sinclair, Peter J N, 1992. "High Does Nothing and Rising Is Worse: Carbon Taxes Should Keep Declining to Cut Harmful Emissions," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 60(1), pages 41-52, March.
  38. Adam Rose & Erwin Bulte & Henk Folmer, 1999. "Long-Run Implications for Developing Countries of Joint Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(1), pages 19-31, July.
  39. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
  40. Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, 2006. "An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 35-38, May.
  41. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Mathai, Koshy, 2000. "Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-38, January.
  42. Geoffrey Heal, 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Financial Framework," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 30(3), pages 387-409, July.
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