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Changement climatique, instruments économiques et propositions pour un accord post-Kyoto : une synthèse

  • DAUBANES Julien

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Paper provided by LERNA, University of Toulouse in its series LERNA Working Papers with number 09.19.295.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:09.19.295
Contact details of provider: Postal: manufacture des Tabacs, 21 allée de brienne, 31200 Toulouse
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  4. Julien Daubanes, 2008. "Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/92, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
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  14. Grimaud, André, 2007. "On the North-South Effects of Environmental Policy: Rent Transfers, Relocation, Incentives to Research and Growth," IDEI Working Papers 477, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  15. Caplan, Arthur J. & Ellis, Christopher J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Winners and Losers in a World with Global Warming: Noncooperation, Altruism, and Social Welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 256-271, May.
  16. Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, 2006. "An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 35-38, May.
  17. Robert N. Stavins, 1999. "The Costs of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed-Preference Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 994-1009, September.
  18. Stavins, Robert & Barrett, Scott & Aldy, Joseph, 2003. "13 + 1: A Comparison of Global Climate Change Policy Architectures," Discussion Papers dp-03-26, Resources For the Future.
  19. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers 197846, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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  24. Hahn, Robert W, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-65, November.
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  32. Roger Guesnerie, 2006. "The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: selected questions in analytical perspective," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590520, HAL.
  33. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1982. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 194-201, March.
  34. Geoffrey Heal, 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Financial Framework," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 30(3), pages 387-409, July.
  35. Adam Rose & Erwin Bulte & Henk Folmer, 1999. "Long-Run Implications for Developing Countries of Joint Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(1), pages 19-31, July.
  36. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
  37. Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1992. "Energy Tax Credits and Residential Conservation Investment," NBER Working Papers 4020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
  39. Sinclair, Peter J N, 1992. "High Does Nothing and Rising Is Worse: Carbon Taxes Should Keep Declining to Cut Harmful Emissions," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 60(1), pages 41-52, March.
  40. Toman, Michael & Shogren, Jason, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-22, Resources For the Future.
  41. J. E. Stiglitz, 1999. "Introduction," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 28(3), pages 249-254, November.
  42. Böhringer, Christoph & Helm, Carsten, 2008. "On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 260-276, May.
  43. Chen, Zhiqi, 1997. "Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 170-188, February.
  44. Daubanes, J., 2007. "On the Optimal Taxation of an Exhaustible Resource Under Monopolistic Extraction," Discussion Paper 2007-34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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