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Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis

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  • Chen, Zhiqi

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  • Chen, Zhiqi, 1997. "Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 170-188, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:32:y:1997:i:2:p:170-188
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Mendelsohn, Robert & Nordhaus, William D & Shaw, Daigee, 1994. "The Impact of Global Warming on Agriculture: A Ricardian Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 753-771, September.
    4. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    5. Barrett, Scott, 1990. "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 68-79, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
    2. Richard S.J. Tol, 2013. "Long live the Kyoto Protocol!," Chapters, in: Roger Fouquet (ed.), Handbook on Energy and Climate Change, chapter 14, pages 344-351, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Shogren, Jason F. & Toman, Michael, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers 10767, Resources for the Future.
    4. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4069 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2018. "North–South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 157-177, September.
    7. Kolstad, Charles D. & Toman, Michael, 2005. "The Economics of Climate Policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 30, pages 1561-1618, Elsevier.
    8. Robert Kohn, 1998. "Environmental Protection by One or Both Trading Partners in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 327-342, October.
    9. Fuhai Hong & Susheng Wang, 2012. "Climate Policy, Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(3), pages 391-411, March.
    10. Cai, Yuezhou & Riezman, Raymond & Whalley, John, 2013. "International trade and the negotiability of global climate change agreements," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 421-427.
    11. Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
    12. Frederic Chantreuil & J. Cooper, 1999. "Setting the initial allocation of marketable emission permits," Post-Print hal-01593998, HAL.
    13. Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
    14. DAUBANES Julien, 2009. "Changement climatique, instruments économiques et propositions pour un accord post-Kyoto : une synthèse," LERNA Working Papers 09.19.295, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    15. Kampas, Athanasios & White, Ben, 2003. "Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 135-147, December.
    16. Kristen A. Sheeran, 2006. "Side Payments of Exceptions: The Implications for Equitable and Efficient Climate Control," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 515-532, Summer.
    17. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 745-767, December.
    18. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Nentjes, Andries, 2020. "Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    19. Richard S.J. Tol, 2002. "Technology Protocols For Climate Change: An Application Of Fund," Working Papers FNU-14, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Sep 2002.

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