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International Trade and the Negotiability of Global Climate Change Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Yuezhou Cai
  • Raymond Riezman
  • John Whalley

Abstract

Country incentives to participate in cooperative arrangements which either fully or partially internalize climate change externalities from carbon emissions involve critical asymmetries. Small countries trade off own country costs of carbon mitigation actions against their own benefits from global improvements in climate which benefit all. Small countries thus have limited incentive to participate as their actions, while costly to them, have a significant impact on global temperature change which mainly benefits others. Here we build on the work of Shapley and Shubik (1969) which suggests that the core of a global warming game without transferable utility may be empty and use numerical simulation methods to analyse country incentives to participate in carbon emission limitation negotiations using a micro global warming structure related to that used by Uzawa(2003).We discuss how the presence of international trade in goods affects the willingness of countries to join international negotiations on climate change. We calibrate our simulation structure to business as usual scenarios for the period 2006-2036. We go significantly beyond the PAGE model relied on in the Stern (2006) report in capturing multi-country interactive effects on the benefit side of climate change mitigation. We show how the perceived severity of global climate change damage influences participation decisions, and importantly how international trade makes participation more likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuezhou Cai & Raymond Riezman & John Whalley, 2009. "International Trade and the Negotiability of Global Climate Change Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14711
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-684, Part I Se.
    2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    3. John Whalley, 1984. "Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262231204, January.
    4. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Hirofumi Uzawa, 1999. "Global warming as a cooperative game," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 2(1), pages 1-37, March.
    6. Chen, Zhiqi, 1997. "Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 170-188, February.
    7. Uzawa,Hirofumi, 2003. "Economic Theory and Global Warming," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521823869.
    8. Uzawa,Hirofumi, 2009. "Economic Theory and Global Warming," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521066594.
    9. Zhiqi Chen, 1997. "Can Economic Activities Lead to Climate Chaos? An Economic Analysis on Global Warming," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 349-366, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dong, Yan & Whalley, John, 2012. "Joint non-OPEC carbon taxes and the transfer of OPEC monopoly rents," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 49-63.
    2. repec:wsi:ccexxx:v:03:y:2012:i:01:n:s2010007812500017 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Huifang Tian & John Whalley, 2009. "Level versus Equivalent Intensity Carbon Mitigation Commitments," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20094, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    4. Dong, Yan & Whalley, John, 2011. "Carbon motivated regional trade arrangements: Analytics and simulations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2783-2792.
    5. Tian, Huifang & Whalley, John, 2010. "Trade sanctions, financial transfers and BRIC participation in global climate change negotiations," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-63, January.
    6. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2017. "International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 312-320.
    7. Thomas Eichner & RĂ¼diger Pethig, 2015. "Is trade liberalization conducive to the formation of climate coalitions?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 932-955, December.
    8. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2011. "Optimal tariff calculations in tariff games with climate change considerations," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(15), pages 1431-1435.
    9. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2009. "How Large are the Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments?," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20093, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    10. Huifang Tian & John Whalley, 2010. "The Potential Global and Developing Country Impacts of Alternative Emission Cuts and Accompanying Mechanisms for the Post Copenhagen Process," NBER Working Papers 16090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Day, Creina & Day, Garth, 2017. "Climate change, fossil fuel prices and depletion: The rationale for a falling export tax," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 153-160.
    12. Huifang Tian & Xiaojun Shi & John Whalley, 2012. "Cross Country Fairness Considerations and Country Implications of Alternative Approaches to a Global Emission Reduction Regime," NBER Working Papers 18443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Huifang Tian & John Whalley, 2015. "Developing Countries And The Unfccc Process: Some Simulations From An Armington Extended Climate Model," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(04), pages 1-22, November.
    14. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2009. "A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 2741, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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