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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

  • Kovalenkov, Alexander
  • Wooders, Myrna

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partitionbalanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 110 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 87-120

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:110:y:2003:i:1:p:87-120
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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