On f-Core Equivalence with General Widespread Externalities
Second version: November, 1995. This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders  for continuum economies with widespread externalities --- i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation suffices. However, in general it is proved only that any f-core allocation is a weak Nash--Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, the proof uses an elementary argument which does not rely on Lyapunov's theorem or convexity of the integral of a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure.
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"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players,"
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- M Ali Khan & Kali P Rath & Yeneng Sun, 1994. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 381, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Feb 1997.
- Yamazaki, Akira, 1978. "An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without Convexity Assumptions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 541-55, May.
- Balder, E. J., 1996. "Comments on the existence of equilibrium distributions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 307-323.
- Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
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