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Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate

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  • Peter J. Hammond

Abstract

August 1999 For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers. JEL: Classifications: D63, D50

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  • Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate," Working Papers 99019, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:99019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 169-225, April.
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    5. Maniquet, Francois, 2001. "On decomposable exchange rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 375-380, March.
    6. Paul Madden, 1978. "Why the Edgeworth Process Assumption Isn't That Bad," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 279-283.
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    8. Diewert, W. E., 1983. "Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation : A comparison of alternative approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 265-302, December.
    9. Paul Champsaur & Guy Laroque, 1982. "A Note on Incentives in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 627-635.
    10. Peter J. Hammond, 1987. "Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 399-412.
    11. Schmeidler, David & Vind, Karl, 1972. "Fair Net Trades," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 637-642.
    12. Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1974. "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(3), pages 425-433, May.
    13. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    14. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    15. Hammond, Peter J., 1986. "Project evaluation by potential tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-36, June.
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    19. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Florig & Jorge Rivera, 2015. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible," Working Papers wp403, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:145-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jorge Rivera & Michael Florig, 2004. "Indivisible Goods and Fiat Money," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 167, Econometric Society.
    4. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2012. "How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(4), pages 617-634, April.
    5. Jorge Rivera C. & Francisco Martínez, 2005. "Consumption rigths: a market mechanism to redistribute wealth," Working Papers wp215, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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