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A Crash Course in Implementation Theory

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  • Jackson, Matthew O.

Abstract

These lectures are meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1076
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