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Equal rights to trade and mediate

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  • Peter J. Hammond

Abstract

August 1999 For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers. JEL: Classifications: D63, D50
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Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Hammond, 2003. "Equal rights to trade and mediate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 181-193, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:181-193
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0255-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Florig & Jorge Rivera, 2015. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible," Working Papers wp403, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    2. Florig, Michael & Rivera, Jorge, 2017. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 145-153.
    3. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2012. "How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(4), pages 617-634, April.
    4. Jorge Rivera C. & Francisco Martínez, 2005. "Consumption rigths: a market mechanism to redistribute wealth," Working Papers wp215, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    5. Jorge Rivera & Michael Florig, 2004. "Indivisible Goods and Fiat Money," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 167, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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