On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities
Second version: November, 1995. This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders  for continuum economies with widespread externalities --- i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation suffices. However, in general it is proved only that any f-core allocation is a weak Nash--Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, the proof uses an elementary argument which does not rely on Lyapunov's theorem or convexity of the integral of a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure.
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- Peter Hammond, 1995. "Four Characterizations Of Constrained Pareto Efficiency In Continuum Economies With Widespread Externalities," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 103-124, 06.
- M Ali Khan & Kali P Rath & Yeneng Sun, 1994.
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Economics Working Paper Archive
381, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Feb 1997.
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- Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
- Yamazaki, Akira, 1981. "Diversified Consumption Characteristics and Conditionally Dispersed Endowment Distribution: Regularizing Effect and Existence of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 639-54, May.
- Hammond, Peter J., 2007.
"History : Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
808, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Ali Khan, M. & Yamazaki, Akira, 1981. "On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 218-225, April.
- Yamazaki, Akira, 1978. "An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without Convexity Assumptions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 541-55, May.
- Balder, E. J., 1996. "Comments on the existence of equilibrium distributions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 307-323.
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