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On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities

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  • Hammond, Peter J.

Abstract

Second version: November, 1995. This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [7] for continuum economies with widespread externalities --- i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation suffices. However, in general it is proved only that any f-core allocation is a weak Nash--Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, the proof uses an elementary argument which does not rely on Lyapunov's theorem or convexity of the integral of a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure.
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  • Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 177-184, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:32:y:1999:i:2:p:177-184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 1997. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 13-46, September.
    2. P.J. Hammond, 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.
    3. Peter Hammond, 1995. "Four Characterizations Of Constrained Pareto Efficiency In Continuum Economies With Widespread Externalities," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 103-124, June.
    4. Yamazaki, Akira, 1981. "Diversified Consumption Characteristics and Conditionally Dispersed Endowment Distribution: Regularizing Effect and Existence of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 639-654, May.
    5. Yamazaki, Akira, 1978. "An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without Convexity Assumptions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 541-555, May.
    6. Ali Khan, M. & Yamazaki, Akira, 1981. "On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 218-225, April.
    7. Balder, E. J., 1996. "Comments on the existence of equilibrium distributions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 307-323.
    8. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
    2. Peter J. Hammond, "undated". "Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann--Hildenbrand Macroeconomies," Working Papers 97022, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    3. Myrna Wooders & Alexander Kovalenkov, 2001. "Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments Nonemptiness and equal treatment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(5), pages 1.
    4. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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