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Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments

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  • Alexander Kovalenkov
  • Myrna Holtz Wooders

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a nonempty varepsilon core. Our second result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed, then all payoffs in the varepsilon $-core treat all players of the same approximate type approximately equally. A bound on the distance between varepsilon core payoffs of any two players of the same approximate type is given in terms of the parameters describing the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:mwooders-98-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "An Explicit Bound on E For Nonemptimess of E-Cores of Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 537, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-05, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
    4. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
    5. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters, in: Carlo Carraro (ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on," Working Papers mwooders-98-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    7. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    8. Thomas Bräuninger, 2007. "Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 173-191, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative games; games without side payments (NTU games); large games; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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