The central assignment game and the assignment markets
Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we provide a generalization of the market model and also show the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.
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- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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