IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/feemwp/311054.html

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Korpela, Ville
  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Saulle, Riccardo D.

Abstract

Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under complete information. The notion of the rotation program predicts the outcomes. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we identify two classes of assignment problems that are implementable in rotation programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., "undated". "An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs," FEEM Working Papers 311054, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemwp:311054
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.311054
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/311054/files/ndl2021-015.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.311054?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    2. Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2020. "A market design approach to job rotation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 180-192.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yu Gu & Yongchao Zhang, 2024. "On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(2), pages 435-453, June.
    2. Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2022. "Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    3. Gu, Yu & Zhang, Yongchao, 2024. "On two mechanisms in job rotation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2017. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp," NBER Working Papers 23265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2023. "Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 963-994, October.
    6. Xinquan Hu & Jun Zhang, 2025. "Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers 2511.22027, arXiv.org.
    7. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    8. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2016. "Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 128-146.
    9. Can, Burak & Pourpouneh, Mohsen & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    10. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 565-584.
    11. Wako, Jun, 2005. "Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 179-199, March.
    12. Thomas Quint & Jun Wake, 2003. "On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1416, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    13. Bettina Klaus & Claudia Meo, 2023. "The core for housing markets with limited externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 779-811, October.
    14. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney, 2022. "Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3110-3128, November.
    15. Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2022. "Greedy Allocations and Equitable Matchings," Papers 2207.11322, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    16. Jeffrey E. Harris & Beatriz G. López-Valcárcel & Patricia Barber & Vicente Ortún, 2014. "Efficiency versus Equity in the Allocation of Medical Specialty Training Positions in Spain: A Health Policy Simulation Based on a Discrete Choice Model," NBER Working Papers 19896, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Fabian R. Pieroth & Martin Bichler, 2022. "$\alpha$-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities," Papers 2211.10317, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    18. Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 2004. "Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 869-887, December.
    19. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    20. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2025. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority‐Based Matching," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(4), August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:feemwp:311054. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.