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Ville Pentti Korpela

Personal Details

First Name:Ville
Middle Name:
Last Name:Korpela
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pko562
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Taloustieteen laitos
Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu
Turun Yliopisto

Turku, Finland
http://www.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/laitoksetjaaineet/ktt/
RePEc:edi:kttsefi (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2022. "Implementation in vNM Stable Set," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0283, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  2. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021. "An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs," Working Papers 2021.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Implementation with foresighted agents," MPRA Paper 102496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  9. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility," Discussion Papers 110, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  10. Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.

Articles

  1. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
  2. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  3. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.
  4. Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.
  5. Ville Korpela, 2017. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
  6. Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
  7. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
  8. Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
  9. Korpela, Ville, 2010. "Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 283-285, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Hayashi & Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2021. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," Discussion Papers 141, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.

  2. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    2. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
    3. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Implementation with foresighted agents," MPRA Paper 102496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.

  3. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Azrieli, Yaron & Jain, Ritesh, 2018. "Symmetric mechanism design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 108-118.

Articles

  1. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
    2. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," Post-Print halshs-00869873, HAL.
    3. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00943301, HAL.
    4. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
    5. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
    6. Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Ville Korpela, 2017. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
    8. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers 1528, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    9. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    10. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
    11. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
    12. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    13. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.

  3. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.

    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Hayashi & Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2021. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," Discussion Papers 141, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
    3. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
    4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.

  4. Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2012. "Behavioral Implementation," Working Papers 2012-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275824, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Horan, Sean, 2016. "A simple model of two-stage choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 372-406.
    4. Takashi Hayashi & Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2021. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," Discussion Papers 141, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.

  5. Korpela, Ville, 2010. "Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 283-285, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
    2. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 17 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (14) 2016-06-09 2019-02-04 2019-07-08 2020-08-17 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2021-02-08 2021-05-31 2021-06-14 2021-06-21 2022-01-03 2022-01-31 2022-02-21 2022-03-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (8) 2019-07-08 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2021-05-31 2021-09-06 2022-01-03 2022-01-31 2022-02-21. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (8) 2014-12-24 2016-06-09 2016-06-18 2019-02-04 2019-07-08 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2022-01-31. Author is listed
  4. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2020-08-17 2022-01-31
  5. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2020-08-17 2021-02-08
  6. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2021-02-08
  7. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2019-02-04
  8. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2016-06-18
  9. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-06
  10. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2014-12-24

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