Implementation without rationality assumptions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275824, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
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- Sean HORAN, 2016. "A Simple Model of Two-Stage Choice," Cahiers de recherche 01-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
More about this item
KeywordsMoore–Repullo set; Nash Implementation; n ≥ 2 Players; Properties α and γ ; C72; D03; D71; D78;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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