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Sequentially Rationalizable Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Manzini
  • Marco Mariotti

Abstract

A sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same fixed set of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to remove inferior alternatives. These concepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments. We study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales. (JEL D01).

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1824-1839 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1824
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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