Rationality and Order-Dependent Sequential Rationality
We show that an individual using a choice function is sequentially rational and the decisions he makes are independent of the order of implementation of the rationales if and only if he is rational with the union of the rationales as a base binary relation. When he makes his decisions following a choice correspondence, the sufficiency part of this claim still holds, the necessity part of it does not. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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