We study the properties of decisions made by committees who select alternatives by constructing shortlists. We find that even when committees are themselves rational, such procedures may not give rise to rational choices. A necessary condition for this to occur is disagreement between committees. However, we delimit substantially the extent of `irrationality' that these procedures allow.
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- Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
- Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice," Microeconomics 0407005, EconWPA, revised 21 Jul 2005.
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