Internal Consistency of Choice
Internal consistency of choice has been a central concept in economics, decision theory, and social choice. This idea is essentially confused. We cannot determine whether a choice function is consistent without referring to something external to choice (e.g., objectives, values). The standard results have to be reexamined in this light. Kenneth J. Arrow's general possibility theorem is extended in this paper without demanding any internal consistency of social choice or any notion of 'social rationality.' Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 61 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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