Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
The paper presents a notion of rationalizing choice functions that violate the “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” axiom. A collection of linear orderings is said to provide a rationalization by multiple rationales for a choice function if the choice from any choice set can be rationalized by one of the orderings. We characterize a tight upper bound on the minimal number of orderings that is required to rationalize arbitrary choice functions, and calculate the minimal number for several specific choice procedures.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica, 2002, vol. 70, pp. 2481-2488.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
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- Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
- Daniel McFadden, 1998.
"Rationality for Economists?,"
98-09-086, Santa Fe Institute.
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