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Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law

Listed author(s):
  • Licht Amir N.

    (Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya)

Registered author(s):

    This paper explores the relations between law and social norms and in particular, the case of legal compliance in groups. Specifically, this paper argues that the rule of law is a social norm interfacing the formal institutions of society with the informal ones. As social institutions, norms should also be analyzed at the societal level a level of analysis that neo-classical economic accounts have failed to address due to fundamental premises of current economic theory. Theories developed in psychology provide a good working framework for social norm analysis in general and of legal compliance (rule of law) in particular. Extant evidence is consistent with the present argument.

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    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2008.4.3/rle.2008.4.3.1232/rle.2008.4.3.1232.xml?format=INT
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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 715-750

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:3:n:3
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