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Conditional corruption

Listed author(s):
  • Dong, Bin
  • Dulleck, Uwe
  • Torgler, Benno

In this paper we discuss whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. We analyze whether the justifiability to be corrupt is influenced by the perceived activities of others. Moreover, we also explore whether – and to what extent – group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. We present evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 33 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 609-627

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:609-627
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

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