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Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation

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  • Christian Traxler

  • Mathias Spichtig

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  • Christian Traxler & Mathias Spichtig, 2011. "Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 237-262, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:102:y:2011:i:3:p:237-262
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-010-0173-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple‐trait distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 139-154, March.
    2. Patricia Funk, 2005. "Governmental Action, Social Norms, and Criminal Behavior," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 522-535, September.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1998. "Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-73, October.
    4. Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1368, CESifo.
    5. Claudia Keser & Frans Van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
    6. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
    7. Traxler, Christian & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 390-398.
    8. Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "On social norms: the evolution of considerate smoking behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 323-340, November.
    9. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
    10. Cinyabuguma, Matthias & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2005. "Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1421-1435, August.
    11. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
    12. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & José A. Scheinkman, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 507-548.
    13. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 615-691, Elsevier.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hokamp, Sascha, 2014. "Dynamics of tax evasion with back auditing, social norm updating, and public goods provision – An agent-based simulation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 187-199.
    2. Debora Di Gioacchino & Domenico Fichera, 2022. "Tax evasion and social reputation: The role of influencers in a social network," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 1048-1069, November.
    3. Claudio J. Tessone & Angel Sanchez & Frank Schweitzer, "undated". "Diversity-induced resonance in the response to social norms," Working Papers ETH-RC-12-017, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.
    4. Guttman, Joel M., 2013. "On the evolution of conditional cooperation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 15-34.
    5. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Fichera, Domenico, 2020. "Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Mankat, Fabian, 2024. "Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 242-267.
    7. Dong, Bin & Dulleck, Uwe & Torgler, Benno, 2012. "Conditional corruption," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 609-627.
    8. Xiao, Erte & Houser, Daniel, 2011. "Punish in public," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 1006-1017, August.
    9. Mankat, Fabian, 2023. "Cooperation, Norms, and Gene-culture Coevolution," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277666, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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