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Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement

  • Traxler, Christian
  • Winter, Joachim

We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations - such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving o work - by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.

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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 8992.

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Date of creation: 21 Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:8992
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