Laws and Norms: Experimental Evidence with Liability Rules
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- Deffains, Bruno & Espinosa, Romain & Fluet, Claude, 2019. "Laws and norms: Experimental evidence with liability rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
- Claude-Denys Fluet & Romain Espinosa & Bruno Deffains, 2017. "Laws and Norms: Experimental Evidence with Liability Rules," Cahiers de recherche 1705, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
- Bruno Deffains & Romain Espinosa & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Laws and Norms: Experimental Evidence with Liability Rules," Post-Print halshs-02276435, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Christoph Rössler & Tim Friehe, 2020. "Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 295-312, October.
- Gianna Lotito & Matteo Migheli & Guido Ortona, 2020. "Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 267-294, October.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2017-11-12 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2017-11-12 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2017-11-12 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2017-11-12 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2017-11-12 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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