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Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Fershtman, C.
  • Weiss, Y.

Abstract

This paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities. The focus of this paper is the circumstances under which sicial rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 17-96, Tel Aviv.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:17-96
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1992. "Habits, Addictions, and Traditions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 327-345, August.
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    5. Rogers, Alan R, 1994. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 460-481, June.
    6. Robson, Arthur J., 1996. "A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 397-424, February.
    7. repec:bla:kyklos:v:45:y:1992:i:3:p:327-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Fershtman, Chaim & Murphy, Kevin M & Weiss, Yoram, 1996. "Social Status, Education, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 108-132, February.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    10. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993, Elsevier.
    11. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Civil institutions and evolution: Concepts, critique and models," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 19-33, February.
    12. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    13. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR;

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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