Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences
This paper examines the role of social rewards as a corrective mechanism for activities which generate externalities. The focus of this paper is the circumstances under which sicial rewards provide effective and feasible incentive mechanism that may replace laws and regulations.
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|Date of creation:||1995|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
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- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1997. "The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 729-758.
- Robson, Arthur J., 1996. "A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 397-424, February.
- Becker, G.S., 1991.
"Habits, Addictions, and Traditions,"
University of Chicago - Economics Research Center
91-8, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
- Gary S. Becker, 1991. "Habits, Addictions, and Traditions," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 71, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Civil institutions and evolution: Concepts, critique and models," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 19-33, February.
- Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
- Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Murphy, Kevin M & Weiss, Yoram, 1996.
"Social Status, Education, and Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 108-32, February.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier.
- George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
- Rogers, Alan R, 1994. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 460-81, June.
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