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Norms and monetary fines as deterrents, and distributive effects

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  • Kangoh Lee

    () (San Diego State University)

Abstract

Both social norms and monetary fines can deter acts that are privately beneficial but socially undesirable. The number and the identities of those who commit the acts differ between with norms and with fines. Fines are more likely to make higher-income individuals better off than norms. As a society becomes more affluent, fines are more likely to increase the number of those who commit than norms, and norms become the better system of deterring socially undesirable acts.

Suggested Citation

  • Kangoh Lee, 2017. "Norms and monetary fines as deterrents, and distributive effects," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-27, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:121:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-016-0517-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-016-0517-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externality; Norms; Fines; Deterrent; Income effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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