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Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance

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  • Assar Lindbeck
  • Sten Nyberg

Abstract

Empirically, disincentive effects on work of generous welfare state arrangements tend to appear with a substantial time lag. One explanation is that norms concerning work and benefit dependency delay such effects. We model altruistic parents' economic incentives for instilling such work norms in their children. Anticipated economic support from parents may reduce work effort, and parental altruism makes threats to withdraw such support noncredible. Instilling norms mitigates this problem. However, generous social insurance arrangements tend to weaken parents' incentives to instill such norms in their children. We find empirical support for this prediction.

Suggested Citation

  • Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:121:y:2006:i:4:p:1473-1503.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/qje/121.4.1473
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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