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Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance

  • Lindbeck, Assar

    ()

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

  • Nyberg, Sten

    ()

    (Department of Economics)

Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation. We also examine the formation of norms requiring children to support their parents financially in old age.

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Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 557.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 02 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0557
Contact details of provider: Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
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Fax: +46 8 665 4599
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