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”Thou shalt not covet ...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values

Author

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  • Matteo Cervellati

    (University of Bologna and IZA Bonn)

  • Paolo Vanin

    (University of Bologna)

Abstract

We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Cervellati & Paolo Vanin, 2010. "”Thou shalt not covet ...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values," Working Papers 2010.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.54
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    Cited by:

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    2. Giacomo Corneo & Frank Neher, 2014. "Income inequality and self-reported values," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 12(1), pages 49-71, March.
    3. Paolo Vanin, 2013. "Social and civil capital," Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Stefano Zamagni (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, chapter 31, pages 306-317, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Buonanno, Paolo & Vanin, Paolo, 2017. "Social closure, surnames and crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 160-175.
    5. Fabrizio Adriani & Silvia Sonderegger, 2018. "The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-32, December.
    6. David Forrest, 2013. "An Economic And Social Review Of Gambling In Great Britain," Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 7(3), pages 1-33.
    7. Adriani, Fabrizio & Matheson, Jesse A. & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2018. "Teaching by example and induced beliefs in a model of cultural transmission," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 511-529.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prohibitions; Temptation; Self-Control; Moral Values; Crime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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