On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Furuya, Kaku, 2002. "A socio-economic model of stigma and related social problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 281-290, July.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000.
"Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective,"
Managerial and Decision Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 243-252.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective," Economics Working Papers 529, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Waldfogel, Joel, 1994. "Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 103-119, March.
- Emons, Winand, 2003.
"A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1991.
"A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders,"
NBER Working Papers
3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984.
"The optimal use of fines and imprisonment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June.
- Cooter, Robert & Porat, Ariel, 2001. "Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 401-422, Part I Ju.
- Rasmusen, E., 1992.
"Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality,"
92-019, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-543, October.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality''," Law and Economics 9506001, EconWPA.
- Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Burnovski, Moshe & Safra, Zvi, 1994. "Deterrence effects of sequential punishment policies: Should repeat offenders be more severely punished?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 341-350, September.
- Lott, John Jr., 1990. "The effect of conviction on the legitimate income of criminals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 381-385, December.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 89-94.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:715-728. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.