Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective
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- Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 243-252.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alexander, C.R. & Cohen, M.A., 1996. "New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime," Papers 96-05, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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- Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June.
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- Alexander, Cindy R & Arlen, Jennifer & Cohen, Mark A, 1999. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 393-422, April.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.
- repec:oup:jcomle:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:1-30. is not listed on IDEAS
- Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007.
"Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 81-106, January.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2004. "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment," Working papers 2004-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Echazu, Luciana & Garoupa, Nuno, 2012. "Why not adopt a loser-pays-all rule in criminal litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 233-241.
- Funk, Patricia, 2004. "On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 715-728, August.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "Collective Responsibility," Working papers 2013-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Werle, Nick, 2015. "A microeconomic model of opportunistic financial crimes: prosecutorial strategy when firms are too big to jail," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68261, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
More about this item
KeywordsLaw Enforcement; Corporation;
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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