Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance
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- Argenton, C. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2014. "Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM e037f38f-8c76-402a-bbaa-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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More about this item
Keywords
illegal behavior; deterrence; agency problems; moral hazard; corporate liability; corporate crime;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2015-01-26 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2015-01-26 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2015-01-26 (Law and Economics)
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