Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
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|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in dans Frontiers in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability, sous la direction de Marcel Boyer, Yolande Hiriart et David Martimort, collection Ashgate Studies in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics , Ashgate Pub Co, 2006, p.�209-233.|
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- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David, 2004.
"The Benefits of Extended Liability,"
IDEI Working Papers
334, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jun 2005.
- Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 731-738, June.
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