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Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies

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  • Dionne, Georges
  • Spaeter, Sandrine

Abstract

Since CERCLA's legislation in the United States, extending the liability to banks in case of an environmental damage has been the main concern of many studies. Most of them show that this form of regulation cannot reach its two main objectives because it is not possible to simultaneously improve prevention done by the frims and increase the funds available for indemnification and clean-up. In this paper, the global effect of CERCLA is revisited in an different but realistic framework.
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  • Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:5-6:p:1025-1060
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    Cited by:

    1. Helm, Carsten, 2008. "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 263-271, December.
    2. Blandine Laperche & Nadine Levratto, 2012. "The Emergence of Ecological Opportunities and Firms’ Behaviour," Chapters, in: Blandine Laperche & Nadine Levratto & Dimitri Uzunidis (ed.), Crisis, Innovation and Sustainable Development, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
    4. Hutchinson, Emma & van 't Veld, Klaas, 2005. "Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 157-173, January.
    5. Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
    6. André SCHMITT & Sandrine SPAETER, 2005. "Hedging Strategies and the Financing of the 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund," Working Papers of BETA 2005-12, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. Julien Jacob & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Large-Scale Risks and Technological Change: What About Limited Liability?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 125-142, February.
    8. André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, 2004. "Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2004-05, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    9. Nicolas Lampach & Kene Boun My & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment," Working Papers of BETA 2016-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    10. Gérard Mondello, 2017. "Lenders and Risky Activities: Strict Liability or Negligence Rule?," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-13, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    11. Sandrine SPAETER, 2002. "Principe de precaution et comportements preventifs des firmes face aux risques environnementaux," Working Papers of BETA 2002-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    12. Schmitt, Andre & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2005. "Improving the prevention of environmental risks with convertible bonds," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 637-657, November.
    13. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO.
    14. Joshua Anyangah, 2012. "On information, extended liability and judgment proof firms," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 61-84, January.
    15. Nicolas Lampach & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "The Efficiency of (strict) Liability Rules revised in Risk and Ambiguity," Working Papers of BETA 2016-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    16. Nguyen, Justin Hung & Phan, Hieu V., 2020. "Carbon risk and corporate capital structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    17. Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2010. "Environmental risks, the judgment-proof problem and financial responsibility," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 77-87, October.
    18. Ichinose, Daisuke, 2011. "Contractor selection problem under extended liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 48-57, March.
    19. Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017. "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.
    20. André SCHMITT & Sandrine SPAETER, 2004. "Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks," Working Papers of BETA 2004-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    21. Anyangah Joshua, 2012. "Mitigating Judgment Proofness: Information Acquisition vs. Extended Liability," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 657-696, December.
    22. Nandy, Monomita & Lodh, Suman, 2012. "Do banks value the eco-friendliness of firms in their corporate lending decision? Some empirical evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 83-93.
    23. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David, 2004. "Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 256, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    24. Spaeter, Sandrine & Verchère, Alban, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 71.
    25. André SCHMITT & Sandrine SPAETER, 2002. "Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible Bonds," Working Papers of BETA 2002-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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