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Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard

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  • Dionne, G.
  • Viala, P.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Dionne, G. & Viala, P., 1992. "Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 9219, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:9219
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundations of Banks' Risk Regulation: a Review of the Literature," Cahiers de recherche 0346, CIRPEE.
    2. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May.
    3. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
    4. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
    5. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
    6. Hellwig, Martin F., 2009. "A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 495-525, October.
    7. Arthur Selender & Liang Zou, 1994. "Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 149-166, June.
    8. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 379-402, August.
    9. R M Rejesus, 2003. "Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 8(2), pages 29-46, September.
    10. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1994. "Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules," Working Papers (Old Series) 9415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

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