IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?

  • R M Rejesus
Registered author(s):

    This article examines the extent to which actual crop insurance indemnification behaviour conforms to the theoretical predictions of two ex post moral hazard models ? costly state verification and costly state falsification ? and then explores whether the closely conforming model can indeed help deter ex post moral hazard in the United States (US) crop insurance program. The results suggest that indemnification behaviour in crop insurance is more in line with the costly state verification model. Following the theoretical predictions of the costly state verification model, however, may not be the optimal policy to deter ex post moral hazard since it is possible for insured producers to deceive loss adjusters and for loss magnitudes to not be truthfully verified.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Economic Issues in its journal Economic Issues.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 2 (September)
    Pages: 29-46

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eis:articl:203rejesus
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Burton Street, Nottingham, NG1 4BU

    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eis:articl:203rejesus. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dan Wheatley)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.