The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1055
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Cited by:
- Pierre Picard, 2020.
"Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 997-1033, December.
- Pierre Picard, 2017. "Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-01448322, HAL.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010.
"Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2009. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 15586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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