Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
This article provides new evidence on moral hazard in insurance markets by analyzing the frequency of automobile bodily injury liability (BIL) claims. We conduct cross-sectional regressions of statewide BIL claims frequency rates on variables representing state economic, demographic, and legal characteristics that affect the marginal costs and benefits of filing claims. As an indicator of moral hazard, we use survey data on consumer attitudes toward various types of dishonest behavior relating to insurance claims. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that attitudes toward dishonest behavior are related to BIL claims frequency, and thus provide evidence of significant moral hazard in automobile insurance markets. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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