Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard
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- Dionne, G. & Viala, P., 1992. "Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 9219, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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- M. Boyer, 2003.
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- Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997.
"Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence,"
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"Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?,"
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- Rejesus, Roderick M., 2002. "Ex Post Moral Hazard In Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification Or Falsification?," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19650, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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- Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Papers 10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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- M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
- Arthur Selender & Liang Zou, 1994. "Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 149-166, June.
- Stanley D. Longhofer, 1994. "Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules," Working Paper 9415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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KeywordsCONTRACTS ; RISK ; ECONOMIC MODELS;
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