A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance
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- Martin Hellwig, 2007. "A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Bijlsma, Michiel & Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2012.
"Competition for traders and risk,"
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8816, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
KeywordsFinancial contracting Debt finance Equity finance Moral hazard Risk choices;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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