Environmental Risk and Extended Liability: the Case of Green Technologies
Since CERCLA's legislation in the United States, extending the liability to banks in case of an environmental damage has been the main concern of many studies. Most of them show that this form of regulation cannot reach its two main objectives because it is not possible to simultaneously improve prevention done by the frims and increase the funds available for indemnification and clean-up. In this paper, the global effect of CERCLA is revisited in an different but realistic framework.
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