The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.005
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- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Working Papers 2010.144, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Institutions and Markets Papers 98454, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- David Martimort & Yolande Hiriart & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Post-Print halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
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Citations
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- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022.
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- Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Leroux, Justin, 2016. "A liability approach to climate policy: A thought experiment," MPRA Paper 75497, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Alfredo Dammert & Arturo Vásquez & Raúl García & Victor Zurita & Humberto Ortiz & Erix Ruiz, 2011. "¿Cuál Es El Costo De La Contaminación Ambiental Minerasobre Los Recursos Hídricos En El Perú?: Comentarios," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2011-326, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
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More about this item
Keywords
Risk regulation; Monitoring; Capture; Integration and separation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
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